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The long road to accession 
The European Court of Justice delivered a long-awaited opinion on the accession of the 
European Union to the European Convention of Human Rights (Opinion 2/13) on 18 
December 2014. To the surprise of many, the judges in Luxembourg held that the draft 
Accession Agreement is not compatible with the EU treaties because it undermines the 
autonomy of EU law. As a consequence, the negotiators will be called back to the drawing 
board to take the Court’s conclusions into account, or to come up with other solutions. The 
Accession Agreement would require a major revision, not just cosmetic changes. Moreover, 
any deal would require the consent of all ECHR contracting parties, including Turkey and 
Russia. With this opinion, the Court of Justice went against the will of the member states and 
has thus put itself on a collision course with them. 
In recent decades the Court has gradually incorporated substantive references to the ECHR 
in its case law, but the journey to formally join the ECHR started more than 20 years ago. 
This journey stalled in 1996 when the Court of Justice held that, as the treaties stood then, the 
European Community had no competence to accede to ECHR (opinion 2/94). In the wake of 
this ruling the EU developed its own Charter of Fundamental Rights and member states 
revised Article 6 TEU to oblige the EU to seek accession to the ECHR, on the condition that 
this would not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the treaties. Protocol No. 8 
added that the Accession Agreement should preserve the characteristics of the Union and its 
legal order; that it may not affect powers of the EU institutions; the position of the member 
states in relation to the ECHR and Article 344 TFEU, which guarantees that all disputes 
between member states regarding “the interpretation or application of the Treaties” shall be 
resolved only by the Court of Justice.  
Opinion 2/13 
In Opinion 2/13 of December 2014, the Court of Justice declared the draft Accession 
Agreement to be incompatible with EU law on a number of grounds. The Court argued that 
the EU’s potential accession to the ECHR would have significant distinctive features because 
the EU is not a state. It repeated the old mantra that the EU is a new legal order of “specific 
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characteristic arising from the very nature of EU law” (para. 166); one that is autonomous 
from national legal orders and public international law. The protection of the autonomy of 
the EU legal order is central to the Court’s opinion. Interestingly, the judges underlined that 
they did not object to being subjected to the jurisdiction of another court, yet hastened to add 
that this would happen only if it would not produce adverse effects on the autonomy of EU 
law. The Court added that 
“any action by the bodies given decision-making powers by the ECHR […] must not 
have the effect of binding the EU and its institutions, in the exercise of their internal 
powers, to a particular interpretation of EU law” (para. 184). 
Neither of these, according to the Court of Justice, is guaranteed by the draft Accession 
Agreement. It can therefore be argued that in this opinion the Court is in fact guarding its 
own exclusive jurisdiction. In the same vein, the judges in Luxembourg found fault with the 
procedure for involving them before a case reaches the Strasbourg-based European Court of 
Human Rights. The Court of Justice of the EU suggested that the coordination mechanism be 
constructed in such a way so as to allow for the interpretation of EU secondary legislation 
(not only for the purposes of checking its validity).  
While the Court continuously stresses that the EU is not a state and that the special 
characteristics of the EU have not been taken into account, these are not really new 
arguments. In fact, the special situation of the accession of an organisation with a complex 
division of competences has been at the heart of the debates in recent years. This, for 
instance, led to the introduction of the so-called ‘co-respondent mechanism’ to ensure that 
proceedings brought before the ECtHR by non-EU member states and individual 
applications would be correctly addressed to member states and/or the EU, as appropriate. 
This mechanism also allows the ECtHR to implicitly decide on the division of competences 
between the EU and its member states. In doing so, the ECtHR would have to interpret EU 
law; something that in the eyes of the Court of Justice can only be done in Luxembourg. 
Admittedly, the Court of Justice has a point. Article 344 TFEU aims to preserve the 
autonomy of the EU legal system and the Court is obliged to safeguard this principle. In 
relation to many issues the Opinion points to the fact that this is actually quite difficult on 
the basis of the draft Accession Agreement.  
One specific argument used by the Court concerns the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), an area in which it has almost no jurisdiction. Stating that “certain acts adopted in 
the context of the CFSP fall outside the ambit of judicial review by the Court of Justice” 
(para. 252), it expresses its displeasure with the idea that the ECtHR would be able to rule on 
the compatibility with the ECHR of “certain acts, actions or omissions performed in the 
context of the CFSP” in cases falling outside of its purview. The question, however, is 
whether the choice by the EU treaty negotiators at the time to maintain a special position for 
many CFSP norms, as far as their judicial review is concerned, implies that possible human 
rights violations in relation to CFSP actions should in general be exempt from judicial 
scrutiny. Arguably, the reason for the special EU arrangement was to prevent judicial 
activism in this area of EU competence. It is questionable whether the Court of Justice can 
legitimately claim its exclusive jurisdiction in this area. While the Lisbon Treaty has certainly 
put the exclusion of the Court (and perhaps also of domestic courts – as hinted at by 
Advocate General Kokott) in relation to CFSP into perspective, there are still clear 
shortcomings and allowing the Strasbourg system to fill some of those gaps would have been 
a welcome improvement. Also, for some member states, it is not at all uncommon to trust the 
ECtHR to play a key role in constitutional protection. 
In general, the Opinion reflects the solid legal reasoning that is in line with six decades of the 
Court’s case law. Yet the arguments made by the Court are so fundamental that one wonders 
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if the demands made by Luxembourg judges can actually be met. To put it differently, the 
question is to what extent the principle of autonomy can be squared with a voluntary 
acceptance of external norms. For states joining the Strasbourg system, it implies acceptance 
of external control. Why should this be different for the European Union? After all, to make 
the EU subject to external norms on fundamental rights was the whole purpose of joining the 
Strasbourg system, as expressed in Article 6(2) TEU. 
Quo vadis? 
Opinion 2/13 thus triggers an existential question: quo vadis? In the short term the Court of 
Justice has ultimately blocked the accession of the European Union to ECHR. It is notable 
that the judges did not agree with Advocate General Kokott, who recommended that the 
Court clear the accession, subject to a number of conditions being met. The Opinion is likely 
to put the Court of Justice on a collision course with the member states that invested much 
effort in making the accession to ECHR a reality and participated in large numbers in 
Luxembourg proceedings. At the same time, it is not surprising to see the Court of Justice 
once again taking a bold step to protect its exclusive jurisdiction. Over the years it has come 
to be a tradition that when spotting a different court on the horizon the judges in 
Luxembourg eliminate the competition in advance. In 1996 the ultimate argument for a 
negative opinion on accession to the ECHR was lack of competence. This time the EU has the 
competence but, according to the Court, the caveats laid down in TEU and Protocol 8 have 
not been adequately addressed by the Accession Agreement and the Court sees too many 
risks that EU law (and its own jurisdiction) will be interpreted and affected from outside 
Strasbourg. The Court in its opinion clarified, to a degree, what is expected. For instance the 
Court held that the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court should be excluded over disputes 
between the member states (or member states and the EU) about application of ECHR within 
the scope of EU law (para. 213).  
While the possibility of solving certain points on the basis of interpretative declarations 
should not be excluded, it is questionable whether this will suffice to meet the Court’s quite 
fundamental objections. If one looks at Article 218(11) TFEU, on which the Opinion is based, 
the options are twofold. Firstly, the EU may request re-negotiation of the Accession 
Agreement. Secondly, it may change the Founding Treaties to accommodate the negotiated 
text. The latter option is political fantasy, so the only way forward seems to be a return to the 
drawing board and re-negotiate the Agreement. Judging by the experience thus far, it will be 
a rather tortuous exercise that is likely to take time. It will give the Court of Justice a chance 
to continue building its line of case law based on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and, in 
the long run, minimise the direct impact of the Strasbourg Court on EU law. No doubt, 
opening the agreed text of the Agreement for further negotiation will not be welcomed by 
some the member states, or by several non-EU parties to the ECHR. At the same time, 
however, some other member states of the Union, the UK in particular, may heave a sigh of 
relief. For the negotiators, particularly those from the European Commission, setting a new 
negotiation agenda will be the first challenge to address. It will not dramatically change the 
dynamics between the member states and the EU institutions. Yet, finding a balanced 
compromise will inevitably pose certain difficulties. One key question remains: how to 
satisfy the Court’s demands without undermining the rationale behind accession.  
